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Abstract Brentano’s metaphysical position in Psychology from an Empirical 
Standpoint is usually assumed to be metaphysical realism. I propose an alter-
native interpretation, according to which Brentano was at that time, as well 
as later, a full-fledged phenomenalist. However, his phenomenalism is 
markedly different from standard phenomenalism in that it does not deny that 
the physicist’s judgments are really about the objective world. The aim of the 
theory of intentionality, I argue, is to allow for extra-phenomenal aboutness 
within a phenomenalist framework. 
 
 
Brentano’s metaphysical position in the 1874 Psychology is a most 
controversial matter.1 The trouble with it is that it seems both realist and anti-
realist at the same time. On the one hand, it seems that Brentano at that time 
endorsed indirect realism about experience. Physical phenomena, he argued, 
are contents of representations which are caused by things existing in the 
external world. On the other hand, he declared that only mental phenomena 
are to be considered really existent — which suggests some psychological 
variety of phenomenalism. 
One possible interpretation, offered by Peter Simons and Tim Crane, is 
that in 1874 Brentano was a metaphysical realist but defended some form of 
phenomenalism for methodological purposes (Simons 1995; Crane 2006). As 
far as the aim of the 1874 Psychology was to lay foundations for descriptive 
psychology, there was no need to be committed to the existence of any mind-
independent reality: mental phenomena were enough. So Brentano could be a 
                                                     
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented in October 2013 at the University of 
Urbino. I am grateful to the audience, especially Venanzio Raspa and Arnaud 
Dewalque, for fruitful discussion and comments. 
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metaphysical realist while arguing at the same time for a phenomenalist 
approach to psychological matters. 
Another influential interpretation is Liliana Albertazzi’s interpretation 
in terms of “immanent realism” (Albertazzi 2006). It is unclear what the term 
means to Albertazzi. If I understand the idea correctly, Brentano’s immanent 
realism is a realism in the ordinary sense of a commitment to the existence of 
mind-independent entities, but it is different from naïve realism in that it 
takes into account what Albertazzi calls their “immanent and irreducible 
categorization by the intentional acts” (Albertazzi 2006: 128). The idea is 
that Brentano affirms both the existence of mind-independent entities and 
their close connection with inner experience: the external things given in 
experience really exist, but they can be classified or conceptualized only on 
the basis of the psychological classification of intentional states. 
Clearly, both interpretations are unsatisfactory. The former attributes 
to Brentano something like the following thesis: there exists some mind-
independent reality absolutely speaking, that is, from the metaphysician’s 
third-person point of view, but there exists no mind-independent reality from 
the psychologist’s first-person or phenomenological point of view. This 
reading is most implausible. At the very least, it seems fairly inconsistent 
with Brentano’s explicit claim according to which the only things that exist 
in themselves are mental phenomena. “It is wrong, Brentano says, to set 
phenomena in opposition to what exists in itself.” (Brentano 1982: 129/137)1 
As I shall try to show, there are good reasons to believe that Brentano’s 
actual position in the Psychology is the exact converse of “methodological 
phenomenalism.” 
The trouble with Albertazzi’s interpretation in terms of “immanent 
realism” is that it is hardly supported by the text. Arguably, it seems that 
even the famous text in which Brentano argues for indirect realism is to be 
interpreted differently than merely as a case for realism, but more on this 
later. 
Since Peter Strawson (1955: 9ff.) it has been usual in metaphysics to 
distinguish between a “revisionary” and a “descriptive” approach to meta-
physical problems. According to the revisionary approach, the task of 
metaphysics is to determine the metaphysical conditions for truth: such and 
such theories, for example quantum field theory or the economical theory of 
value, are assumed to be true, and the task is to specify what must exist for 
the theory to be true. Quine is the most notable proponent of this approach in 
contemporary times. From the descriptive point of view, by contrast, the 
                                                     
1 Original German pagination, followed by pagination of the English translation. 
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metaphysician does not ask what kinds of entities are needed for our theories 
to be true, but how the world looks to us in virtue of our conceptual or 
cognitive systems. Kant is seen as the pioneering figure of this latter 
approach. 
My suggestion is that Brentano’s intentionalism in Psychology from an 
Empirical Standpoint allows to combine the revisionary with the descriptive 
approach. This combination, I think, is both the very heart of Brentanian 
intentionalism and what makes it quite attractive in a metaphysical context. 
Now, the revisionary-descriptive dichotomy provides a helpful frame-
work in order to clarify the nature of Brentanian realism. As Achille Varzi 
noticed, the realist attitude seems more natural from a revisionary point of 
view, and the anti-realist attitude from a descriptivist point of view (Varzi 
2008: 47ff.). In what follows, I shall try to show that in this respect Bren-
tano’s position is unnatural. My position will be that, conversely, Brentano 
was a revisionary phenomenalist and a descriptive realist. The reasons I have 
for thinking so will emerge in the course of this paper. 
A phenomenological definition of intentionality 
One of the most influential interpretations of Brentano’s theory of inten-
tionality and consciousness currently is the so-called self-representational 
interpretation (Kriegel 2003, 2013, forthcoming; Williford 2006). According 
to this interpretation, Brentano in the Psychology of 1874 managed to define 
phenomenal consciousness through intentionality. Consciously being in a 
mental state means having a representation of both its external object and 
itself. In other words: consciousness is just some kind of representation. It is 
that self-representation which must be included in every conscious represen-
tation whatsoever. 
At first glance the idea seems very plausible. Unquestionably, Bren-
tano claims that all representation must look both inward and outward, and 
that the inward-looking intentionality of the intentional state is conscious-
ness. In addition, such an interpretation certainly makes Brentano’s theory 
more easily digested by naturalistic philosophers of mind. Indeed, to define 
phenomenal consciousness by intentionality is the key purpose of the recent 
representational theories of consciousness, including self-representational-
ism. The basic conviction behind most of these theories is as follows: (1) 
intentionality has been naturalized and therefore is no longer a philosophical 
problem; (2) by contrast, phenomenal consciousness is hardly or not at all 
naturalizable, so it is a “hard problem” for philosophers; (3) since it seems 
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better to explicate the more problematic in terms of the less problematic 
rather than the converse, consciousness must be defined in terms of inten-
tionality. 
In two forthcoming papers, I nonetheless suggested that the self-
representationalist interpretation misses the point (Seron forthcoming a, b). 
My hypothesis was that Brentano’s empiricist line of thought is the exact 
converse of the naturalist line of thought underlying the self-representational 
reading. Brentano’s psychology is first of all a psychology “from an em-
pirical standpoint.” That is, Brentano’s aim was not to define consciousness 
in terms of intentionality, but conversely to define intentionality, and thus the 
mental, in terms of phenomenal consciousness; not to naturalize conscious-
ness through intentionality, but, so to speak, to phenomenologize intentional-
ity. 
So I re-read the 1874 Psychology and tried to find out what such a 
phenomenological or empirical definition of intentionality might be. By pull-
ing together some scattered passages found in the Psychology (Brentano 
1973: 114/81, 124/88, 129/92, 132/94), I eventually obtained this reconstruc-
ted formula: 
 
(INT) For all x, x is a representation of A iff x appears and x (really) exists 
and A does not (really) exist and A appears in x. 
 
Its purpose is to define intentionality, and thus mentality, in phenomeno-
logical terms. More precisely: the primitive terms are appearance, real 
existence, and the pheno-mereological relation “appears in” in virtue of 
which the method of Brentano’s psychology is fundamentally psychological 
analysis. The general idea is that having a representation of something means 
being conscious of one’s own mental state as something “in” which 
something else appears. 
This definition has some difficulties, but I think it is globally better or 
at least closer to Brentano’s actual purposes. I will not discuss that point 
here. What I’d like to do is to explore some consequences of endorsing (INT) 
in a metaphysical context. So I will take it for granted and confine myself to 
a couple of brief remarks. 
“… appears” is synonymous with “… is a phenomenon” or “… is 
subjectively experienced” or “… is given to consciousness” in the most 
general sense. Obviously, the definition is false if there exist unconscious 
representations, which Brentano claims is impossible. The expression “A 
appears in x” refers to what Brentano ambiguously calls “in-existence” 
(Inexistenz) or “intentional existence.” The clause “A does not exist” enables 
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one to distinguish the content A from other components of the mental state, 
for example partial states. Instead of “… represents A” and “A appears,” we 
could use the more special phrases “… represents A on a certain 
psychological mode Ψ” (e.g., perceptually, imaginatively, etc.) and “A 
appears on a certain phenomenological mode Φ” (e.g., as present, as 
fictional, etc.). The relation between Ψ and Φ — Husserl’s “noesis-noema 
correlation” — raises a whole series of fundamental questions. 
The definition allows a more intuitive understanding of certain other-
wise puzzling features of intentional facts, especially representational opaci-
ty. The crucial point is that both x and A are phenomena, and that appearance 
does not involve existence. It can seem puzzling that “A exists” does not 
follow from “x represents A,” or that “x represents B” does not follow from 
“x represents A and A = B.” But the ordinary man will see nothing odd or 
anomalous in the idea that “A exists” does not follow from “A appears,” and 
that “B appears” does not follow from “A appears and A = B.” (INT) has 
some other interesting features. Among other things, it should be noted that 
the only connection between x and A, mental and physical phenomena, is the 
mereological relation “appears in.” 
Intentionality and reference 
What does all this have to do with Brentano’s realism? To begin with, it must 
be kept in mind that the key questions raised in the 1874 Psychology are of 
an ontological nature. As I will suggest, for Brentano the question of inten-
tionality is basically an ontological matter. 
As far as psychological theories are true or false, they presumably 
refer to something. So the psychologist is presumably committed to the 
existence of certain entities, while he can leave aside some other entities. In 
my view, the question of intentionality for Brentano is as follows: given that 
all mental states must be intentional and that the psychologist must therefore 
make use of intentional phrases, what do her intentional phrases refer to? 
What kind of entities must the psychologist assume as existent when she 
talks of mental facts such as “imagining x” or “believing that p”? 
The only purpose of definition (INT), as well as of Brentano’s theory 
of intentionality as a whole, I think, is to provide an answer to this simple 
question. What the definition tells us is this: Consider all the psychologist 
talks about, that is, in Brentano’s conception: all that appears in the mind. 
What exists in there? When you say you imagine Pegasus, should Pegasus be 
said to exist? Or the state of imagining? Or none of them? Or something 
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else? The whole “problem of intentionality” lies in the simple fact that, 
among the things given in the mind, some exist while others do not. In other 
words: the psychologist should recognize some phenomena as existent, and 
some others as inexistent. So, we could say that the function of the definition 
is to indicate which parts of the psychologist’s intentional phrases are 
referential, and which are not. 
Let us take an example from Brentano — a very famous one, actually: 
“The centaur is a poetic fiction.” (Brentano says “a centaur,” but for some 
reasons I prefer “the centaur.”) This example was used by John Stuart Mill as 
an objection against Brentano’s view that every predicative judgment is 
reducible to an existential judgement. Mill’s objection was that the judgment 
“the centaur is a poetic fiction” obviously does not commit one to the 
existence of a centaur. 
Now, let’s turn to Brentano’s response. Like Russell later, Brentano 
thinks that much of the problem of reference is due to grammatical illusions. 
So what he proposed is to rephrase the sentence. Instead of “the centaur is a 
poetic fiction,” he argues, it would be clearer to say, “There is a poetic fiction 
which conceives the upper parts of the human body joined to the body and 
legs of a horse” (Brentano 1925: 61). What does it mean? The idea is that, 
despite appearances, the former sentence actually refers not to the centaur, 
but to a mental fact. It is this mental fact actually that is recognized as 
existent in the corresponding judgement. We can, so to speak, use the 
language of mere appearance and say “the centaur is a poetic fiction,” but if 
we wish to identify the existential commitments, as Mill certainly did, then 
we have to use the language referentially and rephrase the sentence as a 
sentence about the poets’ mental states. 
However, Brentano’s response is not fully satisfying. For the word 
“centaur” appears also in the intentional phrasing “the poets imagine the 
centaur.” We might be tempted — and it would be quite natural — to 
construe this latter sentence as relational, that is, in such a way that the 
corresponding judgment commit us to the existence of the centaur. Since it is 
absurd, Mill would thus be right in saying that not all judgements are exis-
tential judgements. 
This brings us to Brentano’s distinction between modus rectus and 
modus obliquus. This distinction has something to do with the distinction 
between referential transparency and opacity. The sentence “some poets 
imagine the centaur” refers in modo recto to some poets’ mental states, and 
in modo obliquo to the centaur. How is such talk about the centaur possible? 
Why do the words we use sometimes refer to existent objects, and sometimes 
not? The answer lies in our definition of intentionality: intentional sentences 
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of the form “x represents A” confront us with phenomenal data of which 
some exist and some don’t exist. You can talk about inexistent things which 
appear to you in your mind, but thereby you won’t refer to them directly. 
At first glance, it seems possible to express that idea in terms of 
indirect reference: there exists no object called “the centaur” of which you 
may have a direct presentation. Yet oblique or indirect reference is 
something more than no direct reference. Indirect reference involves there 
being some direct reference elsewhere, otherwise the notion would hardly 
make sense. Accordingly, the question is, What does the term “the centaur” 
directly refer to? Once again, the answer is that the sole existing object 
referred to here is the mental state. What “the centaur” refers to in the sen-
tence “some poets imagine the centaur” is a certain psychological property of 
the mental state in virtue of which it is about the centaur. Since nothing 
outside the mental state is referred to, this property must be an intrinsic 
feature of the mental state. The centaur appears yet does not exist, the sole 
object the judgment recognizes as existent is the mental state with its 
intrinsic features, including the property of being about the centaur. 
In a word, the modus rectus-modus obliquus distinction provides a 
criterion for identifying the reference of intentional phrases. So it provides a 
general answer to the question, What is the psychologist ontologically 
committed to as far as she makes judgments of the form “x represents A”? 
But the conclusion to be drawn from this is more general, actually. Accord-
ing to the later Brentano at least, modus obliquus is a general feature of every 
judgement about physical reality. That is, every judgement about physical 
reality actually refers to phenomena in the mind. He writes in this con-
nection, in the third volume of his Psychology: 
So it is not what is known (erkannt) “as an object” that is really affirmed 
(anerkannt), but only the mental agent who relates to it as its object. (…) It is 
certain that we — or any other being who, with immediate evidence, grasps 
something as a fact — cannot thereby have as our object anything else than 
ourselves. (Brentano 1974: 5-6, my translation) 
For example, it can be that you know that this table is in wood, but the belief 
that this table is in wood actually commits you only to the existence of the 
corresponding phenomena in the mind. 
Plausibly, this more general conception can be viewed as a con-
sequence of Brentano’s interpretation of intentional sentences. It seems that 
Brentano’s train of thinking runs something like this. First, recognizing 
something as existent requires some immediate evidence of it. Secondly, the 
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only existence that is immediately evident to me is that of my represent-
ations, which is expressed linguistically by intentional sentences of the form 
“x represents A.” Now, the reference of sentences of the form “x represents 
A” is purely mental. Therefore, mental states are the only entities I am 
entitled to recognize as existent. 
Thus far, it seems that my reading lends support to Crane’s and 
Simons’ view according to which Brentano’s position in the Psychology is 
“methodological phenomenalism.” For Brentano, we are tempted to con-
clude, the psychologist deals only with appearances, and what may be called 
her objects are just those appearances which her judgements about 
representations recognize as existent. More generally: the only things that 
exist really or “in themselves” are mental phenomena. This — fairly 
phenomenalist-flavored — view is explicitly embraced by Brentano in his 
1888-1889 lessons on descriptive psychology, which we will be coming back 
to shortly. 
However, Brentano’s position is more complex. Suppose you look at a 
cup of coffee and believe that it has some objective property P, say, the 
property of being seven centimeters high. Would Brentano’s account of this 
be phenomenalist? A true phenomenalist would say: “You believe that P is a 
property of some material thing behind the phenomena, but this is a mistake, 
actually P is a property of the phenomena and I can prove it as far as I can 
define P as a complex of phenomenal properties.” 
Obviously, this is not exactly what Brentano would say. He would say, 
I think, that sensory data are not such that they can be seven centimeters 
high, “seven centimeters high” is a genuine objective property, which 
nonetheless can be talked about only in modo obliquo. True, the object 
referred to is ontologically no more than a phenomenon in the mind, but the 
judgement about its being P, so to speak, involves some semantical extra in 
virtue of which it is not a judgement about mental states, but about a cup of 
coffee. There is nothing outside your mind that is a centaur and has a horse 
tail, but the centaur’s having a horse tail is not a merely psychological fact as 
are your fictional state’s duration or intensity. 
This anti-phenomenalist tenet, in my view, is at the basis of Bren-
tano’s theory of intentionality. The idea is that modus obliquus is different 
from direct reference and more than indirect reference. Although the centaur 
is nothing outside the mind, talk of it and its property of having a horse tail is 
more than talk of mental phenomena. The statement “the centaur has a horse 
tail” refers only to mental states, yet it is really about the centaur’s having a 
horse tail. As a result, intentional aboutness is to be distinguished from the 
ontological relation of reference (cf. Loar 2003). 
Bull. anal. phén. X 4 (2014) 
http://popups.ulg.ac.be/1782-2041/ © 2014 ULg BAP 
8
A clear illustration of this line of thought can be found in the lecture 
entitled “Descriptive Psychology or Descriptive Phenomenology” of the 
years 1888-1889. In this lecture, Brentano, like Husserl later in the first 
edition of his Logical Investigations, declares that the term “descriptive 
psychology” is equivalent to the term “phenomenology.” This characteriz-
ation occurs only once in Brentano’s work, one year later he opted for the 
term “psychognosy” which he used until the end. 
The meaning of this identification of descriptive psychology with 
phenomenology becomes clear if we take a look at definition (INT). The 
definition means that the psychologist’s judgements of the form “x represents 
A,” and hence psychology as a whole, actually have to do only with pheno-
mena. As a consequence, the theory to which such judgements belong, name-
ly descriptive psychology, must be a theory of phenomena or phenomeno-
logy. 
However, (INT) also reveals that there must be two different kinds of 
phenomena, namely those which really exist, the mental phenomena, and 
those which don’t really exist, the physical phenomena. Therefore, it seems 
that phenomenology is somehow broader than descriptive psychology. That 
is why Brentano says that “by calling the description of phenomena descrip-
tive psychology one particularly emphasizes the contemplation of mental 
realities” (Brentano 1982: 129/137). But if so, why did he maintain that 
phenomenology and descriptive psychology are one and the same thing? 
Clearly, the answer is: because the phenomenologist who talks in obliquo 
about physical phenomena actually refers in recto to mental phenomena. 
Both refer to the same mental realities, although they talk about different 
things. 
Consequently, it is deceiving to say that phenomenology deals with all 
kinds of phenomena while descriptive psychology deals only with mental 
phenomena. In fact, physical phenomena, too, are objects of inner perception 
and thus belong, in some sense, to the mental realm: 
One is telling the truth if one says that phenomena are objects of inner percep-
tion, even though the term “inner” is actually superfluous. All phenomena are 
to be called inner because they all belong to one reality, be it as constituents 
or as correlates. (Brentano: 129/137) 
Conversely, there is a sense in which psychology refers to physical pheno-
mena as well. The psychologist studies physical phenomena as contents or 
intrinsic features of mental states. As Brentano says in 1874: 
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With respect to the definition of psychology, it might first seem as if the 
concept of mental phenomena would have to be broadened rather than 
narrowed, both because the physical phenomena of imagination fall within its 
scope at least as much as mental phenomena as previously defined, and 
because the phenomena which occur in sensation cannot be disregarded in the 
theory of sensation. It is obvious, however, that they are taken into account 
only as the content of mental phenomena when we describe the specific 
characteristics of the latter. (Brentano 1973: 140/100) 
One possible consequence of this Brentano’s view has to do with logic. 
Shifting our focus away from Brentano specifically, we could make the 
following hypothesis: just as the statement “the centaur has a horse tail” can 
be said to be in obliquo about the centaur although only referring to some 
appearance in the mind, so logical truths can be said to be about logical 
entities although referring only to psychological entities such as judgements 
and inferences. 
This is, basically, the Brentano-inspired approach promoted by Husserl 
in his Logical Investigations. Logical truths such as the principle of non-
contradiction are about propositions, and a proposition is just a “species of 
judgement,” namely some psychological feature which Husserl calls the 
“intentional matter” of the mental state. So, when the logician enunciates a 
logical truth about propositions, she actually refers only to mental entities. 
That is why, as Barry Smith (1989: 62) rightly stressed, Husserl’s position in 
the Prolegomena is logical Aristotelism rather than Platonism. 
But on the other hand, Husserl rejects logical psychologism. To him, 
logic really is about propositions in themselves, not mental states, and logical 
truths are thus independent of psychological truths. “True” and “false” are 
logical, not psychological features. How can this be? The situation gets much 
clearer if we say, in Brentanian terms, that mental states provide the in recto 
subject matter of logical truths, and propositions in themselves their in 
obliquo subject matter. Although logical truths refer to no other objects than 
mental states, they are not about mental states, they are about purely logical 
entities, propositions in themselves. 
Metaphysical consequences 
With this in mind, let’s return now to our central topic of discussion: Bren-
tano’s realism. To begin with, there is surely a sense in which, in Strawson’s 
terms, Brentano is a revisionist metaphysician. Part of his purpose in writing 
the Psychology was to make clear what our judgements really refer to, or 
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what the furniture of the world is, given the fact that it is immediately evident 
to me that I have representations. 
As we have seen, Brentano’s revisionary metaphysics thus understood 
is typically phenomenalist. However, I do not agree with Crane and Simons 
that this phenomenalism is merely “methodological.” As already mentioned, 
the question is not only what kind of objects are studied in psychology, but 
also what must exist “in itself” as far as, generally speaking, some of our 
judgments are true. And most importantly, this clearly applies to the 1874 
Psychology as well. 
The belief that there is some red spot on my shirt is certainly about a 
physical phenomenon, say, about some particles of wine. But paradoxically, 
it involves referring to nothing except the mind itself. As Brentano stresses in 
the Psychology of 1874: 
We said that mental phenomena are those phenomena which alone can be 
perceived in the strict sense of the word. We could just as well say that they 
are those phenomena which alone possess real existence as well as intentional 
existence. Knowledge, joy and desire really exist. Color, sound and warmth 
have only a phenomenal and intentional existence. (Brentano 1973: 129/92) 
It is surprising how little attention Brentano scholars have paid to such 
explicit claims. Brentano asserts very explicitly that mental phenomena are 
the only things that really exist — and yet one continues to read the 
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint as a plea for realism. Albertazzi, 
for example, claims that Brentano’s “immanent realism” in the Psychology 
“lies in its attempt to conciliate the presence of an often irreducible trans-
cendent foundation of perception with its immanent and equally irreducible 
categorization by the intentional acts” (Albertazzi 2006: 128). But where in 
the Psychology does Brentano talk of such an “irreducible transcendent 
foundation of perception”? 
This brings us back to the passage where Brentano seems to advocate 
indirect realism about perception. Here is the text in question: 
We have seen what kind of knowledge the natural scientist is able to attain. 
The phenomena of light, sound, heat, spatial location and locomotion which 
he studies are not things which really and truly exist. They are signs of some-
thing real, which, through its causal activity, produces presentations of them. 
They are not, however, an adequate representation of this reality, and they 
give us knowledge of it only in a very incomplete sense. We can say that 
there exists something which, under certain conditions, causes this or that 
sensation. We can probably also prove that there must be relations among 
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these realities similar to those which are manifested by spatial phenomena 
shapes and sizes. But this is as far as we can go. In and of itself, that which 
truly exists does not come to appear, and that which appears does not not truly 
exist. The truth of physical phenomena is, as they say, only a relative truth. 
The phenomena of inner perception are a different matter. They are true in 
themselves. As they appear to be, so they are in reality, a fact which is 
attested to by the evidence with which they are perceived. Who could deny, 
then, that this constitutes a great advantage of psychology over the natural 
sciences? (Brentano 1973: 28-29/19, translation slightly modified) 
What’s Brentano’s thesis in this short passage? There are a number of things 
worth noting here. Actually, Brentano makes at least three distinct claims: 
First, it would be misleading to say that mind-independent things 
“appear” to us. If there exist such entities, then they don’t properly appear. 
What appears are their “signs” or causal effects in the mind, namely the 
phenomena. As Brentano declares, “in and of itself, that which truly exists 
does not come to appear, and that which appears does not not truly exist” 
(Brentano 1973: 28/19, translation mine). 
Secondly, there is no reason to believe in the existence of some 
“correspondence” relation between phenomena and external reality, besides 
the sign or causal relation. The existence of phenomena suggests that there 
may exist external things which cause them, and that their relations may be 
analogous to phenomenal relations. “But, Brentano says, this is as far as we 
can go.” 
The third thesis is that all this does not apply to inner perception and 
the mental. Necessarily the mental is really so as it appears to be, and appears 
really so as it is in reality. As a result, Brentano concludes, “mental pheno-
mena are true in themselves,” while “the truth of physical phenomena is only 
a relative truth.” 
Let’s now turn our attention to this last claim: supposing that the 
natural scientist’s judgments are to be called “true,” their truth must be only a 
“relative truth.” What does it mean? That something is true or exists in a 
relative fashion obviously does not mean that it is false or does not exist, but 
that it is not true or does not exist in itself. On the other hand, the natural 
scientist’s judgements are about physical phenomena like sounds, light, and 
heat. Just as the latter exist only intentionally, not really, so the former are 
thus true only relatively, not in themselves. But we have seen that for 
something to exist in itself means to be referred to in modo recto. The natural 
scientist’s judgements are true relatively because they refer to physical 
phenomena not in recto, but in obliquo. Their being relatively true thus 
means something like this: they are about physical phenomena, but actually 
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refer to, or are made true by, mental phenomena. Your judgement about the 
cup of coffee’s being P is not true in itself, but true for you, that is, under the 
condition that it is true in itself that your representation of the cup of coffee 
as being P exists. 
This, needless to say, is all but a realist view. But it nonetheless paves 
the way for some new form of realism. For Brentano, as we have seen, did 
not consider objective properties reducible to psychological properties. What 
the statement “the cup of coffee is P” means is not merely, as in the 
phenomenalist view, that something appears with some phenomenal property 
Q. Rather, the statement refers to the fact that the cup of coffee obliquely 
appears with the objective property P, that is, appears to be P “in itself.” It 
may be true (in iself) that the cup of coffee is P, but only in obliquo or for 
me. To put it otherwise: the judgement “the phenomenon A appears to me as 
existent” does not imply that there exists some phenomenon A which appears 
to me; and its appearing true to me does not imply that it is true in itself. 
Therefore, as definition (INT) clearly shows, there are phenomena which 
appear to exist yet do not exist, and such phenomena are called “physical 
phenomena.” 
This is exactly what Strawson had in mind with his idea of a 
“descriptive” appoach to metaphysical issues. You can certainly be a realist 
and make true judgements about mind-independent reality, but you ought to 
know that your judgements will thereby be true only in a relative way, that is, 
they will be true of physical reality as it appears in the mind. So, if there 
were no mind and hence no appearance in the mind whatsoever, there would 
be no true judgements at all, whether about mental or physical entities. 
Accordingly, if there is a sense in which metaphysical realism is true, 
then metaphysical realism must be, quite paradoxically, about how the 
external world appears to be in itself in virtue of the nature of the 
corresponding mental states, not about how the world is in itself. For not the 
world, but its appearance in the mind exists in itself. To summarize: relative 
truth about mind-independent reality implies relative realism. In Strawsonian 
terms: “descriptive” realism. 
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